India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty constituted a serious violation of international law. The suspension unmistakably reflected an act of aggression and extremism by India.

However, it remained significant to observe that India lacked the authority to suspend or terminate the treaty unilaterally.

The Indus Waters Treaty stood as an internationally recognised and guaranteed agreement. In the event that India unilaterally suspended or terminated it, inevitable questions arose regarding all other agreements India had executed with foreign states.

The World Bank also served as a guarantor of the treaty.

A critical question arose over whether India could unilaterally terminate or suspend the Indus Waters Treaty.

According to the treaty, India possessed no legal right to take such a step independently.

Also Read: India suspends Indus Waters Treaty, expels Pakistanis, closes Attari post

Article 12(4) of the agreement allowed termination only through the written consent of both India and Pakistan. In effect, a termination would have required a jointly drafted and ratified agreement.

The treaty contained no provision that permitted unilateral suspension. Its nature prescribed an indefinite duration and did not limit its validity to any particular event or timeframe.

Both nations remained equally bound by the Indus Waters Treaty. A withdrawal from the agreement amounted to a violation.

If India halted compliance with the treaty under the pretexts of “annulment”, “suspension”, “withdrawal”, or “cancellation”, this act indicated an attempt to obstruct the flow of water to Pakistan. What India identified as “annulment” or “withdrawal”, Pakistan defined as a “violation”.

Another pressing concern emerged about the implications of India blocking the downstream flow of Pakistani water and whether it could establish a precedent for China upstream.

If India proceeded to block Pakistani rivers, it not only violated international water law but also introduced a perilous precedent.

As prescribed under international law, an upstream nation such as India did not possess the right to hinder the flow of water to a downstream nation such as Pakistan, regardless of the existence of the Indus Waters Treaty.

Such conduct by India set a precedent of regional behaviour that might affect international legal standards.

China could potentially exploit the precedent and justify obstructing the Brahmaputra River’s flow.

Therefore, this decision by India endangered not only Pakistan but also posed strategic risks for India itself, especially under the watchful scrutiny of powerful nations such as China.

The Indus Waters Treaty, finalised in 1960, existed as a resilient and enduring agreement. It contained no clause that allowed unilateral suspension or termination.

Amendments to the treaty could only occur through mutual consent and the formal ratification of both parties.

India’s unilateral suspension disregarded the treaty’s institutional mechanisms—such as the Permanent Indus Commission, neutral experts, or an arbitral tribunal—and contradicted the foundational spirit of the agreement.

The treaty had already survived several armed conflicts and diplomatic crises, which further established its legal authority and moral legitimacy.